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Mathematical moments: Autoethnographic excursions with a 
mathematical outsider sociologist 
 
Michael Corbett1 
Faculty of Education, University of Tasmania, Australia 
 
ABSTRACT: In this essay I offer some reflections on the field of mathematics education, 
and particularly the sociopolitical analysis of mathematics education that has emerged in 
contemporary scholarship. Here I attempt to do two things. First of all I respond to a 
recent book on “disorder” in mathematics education, identifying some themes and 
problematics that I find intriguing and generative from my perspective outside the field.  
Here I reflect on the way that mathematics is positioned in educational discourse 
generally as a proxy for human capital and general intelligence. Next I relate stories from 
my life and practice as a primary school teacher in which mathematics, as I understood it, 
bumped productively against problems in everyday life. Finally, I conclude with a 
reflection on the productive tension between naïve place-based mathematical 
understandings and abstract context-bridging mathematical knowledge forms.  
 
Keywords: mathematics education, sociology of education, mathematisation, 
demathematisation, autoethnography 
 
I. Introduction 
To begin with, I read and write into the field of mathematics education as an outsider.  As 
an educational sociologist it seems remarkable to me that what appears to many outside 
the field as the abstract, orderly, mysterious and esoteric world of mathematics and 
mathematics education is just as fraught with disorder, ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
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complexity as any other educational space. In this paper I offer an outsider’s reading of 
what I take to be some key sociopoltical issues in mathematics education as they are 
articulated in a recent book (Straehler-Pohl, Bohlman & Pais 2017) that takes up the 
disorderly nature of the field. This argument about disorder seems to me to reflect both 
the order and disorder introduced into contemporary societies by the application of 
mathematics in a range of social fields to achieve technical and sociopolitical ends. At the 
same time, the book offers a critique of the way that mathematics are presented as both a 
proxy for pure intelligence, and an easily quantifiable human capital-related solution for 
complex social, economic, and educational problems. Mathematical credentials and 
understandings have been, it seems clear to me, constructed as a key form of what 
educational sociologists call deficit framing of particular groups of people as deficient 
participants in contemporary economies and societies (Gorski 2011, Gutiérrez 2012). 
As I read pieces in the edited collection by Straehler-Pohl, Bohlmann and Pais, I 
am struck by the irony of the mathematization/demathematization paradox that sits in 
many of the contributions. What I mean by a paradox is the way that two apparently 
contradictory ideas can simultaneously find support in the messy social spaces in which 
we currently operate. I have found this idea and the tensions it contains to be highly 
provocative. Here, mathematics is simultaneously central to the conduct of everyday life 
while mathematical skills necessary for everyday functioning appear, in many ways, to 
have diminished as mathematical machines and algorithms operate much of the working 
surface the most advanced capitalist societies (see e.g. Chevallard 2007, Jablonka & 
Gellert 2007, Straehler-Pohl 2017). For instance, Chevallard (2007) raises the paradox of 
a society that requires mathematics to function, but which contains a majority of people 
who have little or no need for most forms of mathematical knowledge. This has rather 
obviouc implications for the teaching of mathematics to people whose lives are situated 
within this paradox.  
What use is mathematics today? 
So what use is mathematics today? Or more precisely, how can mathematics be useful for 
individuals and groups differently positioned in social space? How can it stimulate order, 
how does it promote disorder, and indeed what is the relationship between these seeming 
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polar ideas? The question takes on additional complexity as we move from a 
consideration of the singular “use” of mathematics to the pluralized idea of multiple 
situated “uses.”  
Indeed, it seems to me that mathematics education, has tended to relate to: a) the 
inherent value study of the subject itself as a formal, orderly system or language and a 
valued mental exercise which is often used for social sorting and conflated with 
intelligence itself (Bourdieu 1993), and, b) as a practical tool for getting things done, for 
example, in the creation of objects and processes, and for the enhancement of capabilities 
or “human capital” of groups and individuals.  Less common is a framing of mathematics 
in political terms as a means of ordering and dividing the world, for example: 1) in the 
quantification of human skills, qualities and knowledge, 2) in the comparison and 
surveillance of individuals and groups for commercial or regulatory purposes, or 3) in 
medical, health and self-care practices through metrics and mathematically derived 
procedures. Here we encounter a different sense of the “use” of mathematics as a tool for 
technical control rather than individual capability formation (Habermas 1972). A further 
and related question concerns why has mathematics been so successful within the 
hierarchy of curriculum, but also in the more mundane and functional positioning of 
numeracy, along with its indispensible side-kick literacy, as an umbrella meta-curricular 
space to be embedded within all school subjects.   
It is not new to suggest that it is not the practicality of mathematics that confers 
elite curricular status, but precisely the opposite (see e.g. Gates & Vistro-Yu 2003). It can 
even be argued that at the societal level, contrary to human capital theory and common 
educational discourse, that poor mathematics results may not be particularly 
consequential in economic terms. This point was made by Guardian columnist Simon 
Jenkins (2016) when he argued that languishing in the international league tables in 
mathematics has not harmed the United States or British economies. The same argument 
could be made about Germany, Norway, or Australia. This perhaps illustrates one irony 
of mathematization/demathematization, which is that even most advanced capitalist 
societies the quotidian utility of mathematical knowledge for most citizens is dubious, 
and, as Chevallard (2007, p. 56) puts it, “all but a few of their members can and do live a 
gentle, contented life without any mathematics whatsoever (emphasis in original).” It 
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may also be the case that those nations that score highest on established measures of 
mathematics performance like the PISA and TIMSS are neither economic leaders, 
innovation trend-setters, nor do they appear to be producing the kinds of creative labour 
force leading the emerging phase of global economic development. To use Bourdieu’s 
(1984) language, powerful mathematics has become increasingly distant from necessity, 
at least the necessities faced by most people in an increasingly risky (Beck 1992) and 
even precarious political economy (Standing 2014; Bauman 2000, 2004). At the level of 
capital formation and wealth production, the most valuable mathematical knowledge and 
procedures have become highly specialized tool kits used to build machines, facilitate 
financialization (Sassen 2014), to form, regulate and surveil populations, and to manage 
risk. 
Another notion in play in the Straehler-Pohl et al. collection is the idea that 
mathematics is a bit of a sinister force in the world because it has been largely co-opted 
and mobilized to create means of surveillance, control that conceals the exercise of power 
behind an allegedly innocent and objective veil of data. The data-driven decision-making 
movement both reflects and formats educational practice. There is also a sense in which 
the mathematization/demathematization of the world contributes to deskilling many 
aspects of contemporary life, subsequently making people more vulnerable and perhaps 
lazy in the bargain. This connects rather nicely with the mathematical dimensions of the 
problems of alienation and the general capitalist tendency to increase profitability by 
replacing labour with machines. Today’s mechanization is significantly mathematical and 
algorithmic. 
On the other hand, with the advent of big data, mathematics can assume the 
mantle of a moral democratizing force offering the potential for mass tracking of opinion 
and preference (without the trouble and messiness of debate!). Rule by plebiscite is now 
an important conservative policy position, which is not surprising given the power of 
established interests to manipulate mass opinion. Leaders can now know with some 
precision the will of the masses on a moment-by-moment basis using data people 
willingly provide and in turn use this superior knowledge (or even outright lies 
masquerading as this form of knowledge as Donald Trump routinely does) to manage 
those same populations. As the capacity of social networking and other information-
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gathering technologies increases, the strength of the claims that their owners can make 
about somehow “knowing” the mind of the people advances apace (Hague & Loader 
1999, Rudder 2014, Townsend 2013). The new knowledge produced by the analysis of 
big data have created new ways of holding a mirror up to social processes and have 
generated new “games”, an issue I will return to in the conclusion. 
This development suggests that the reason for mathematics’ success in the school 
curriculum as both an important subject, and as a kind of proxy for raw intelligence, as 
Bourdieu (1994) claimed, has to do with how amenable school mathematics is for 
creating a disciplined and automatic subject. It is also a useful mechanism for sorting and 
selecting cadre of highly trained instrumental workers who can create metrics and 
systems of measurement, comparison and predication which can further the insight and 
interests of the capitalist class.  Mathematics then is sinister because of the ways in which 
it tends to be mobilized in the service of established interests.   
Autoethnography: The experience of mathematics and the mathematics of 
experience 
To return though to the problem of whether or not mathematic is any good to ordinary 
people in a given social space, I will relate two specific incidents where as a non-
mathematician, and indeed as someone who would not really count himself as a 
mathematical enthusiast, I came to consider mathematics as a social practice rather than 
as a matter of pure calculation. My account is deliberately disorderly, mirroring what I 
take to be the messiness of the way I have understood and taught mathematics to primary 
students achieving only a faint glimmer of the capacity of mathematical thinking to offer 
an orderly sort of direction to my affairs. To illustrate these brief glimpses of what 
mathematics could do for me, I offer an autoethnographic (Ellis 2003) account of what I 
call two “mathematical moments.  
Autoethnography is a way of excavating experience through reflexively through 
the process of writing as a methodology in itself (Green 2015). My own background was 
working class and like most of my peers I was largely disengaged from secondary school 
mathematics barely passing my final courses at the end of high school. I now see my 
performance in school mathematics in terms of the conceptual landscapes opened by 
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Bourdieu (1984, 1992) and Bernstein (1977, 2000, 2008), which speaks to the differential 
ability of young people to be able to achieve the point of sight required for success in 
higher mathematics, and in other areas of advanced school curriculum. For me, 
mathematics did not address mundane problems and I could not deal well with what I 
saw as the decontextualized, irrelevant, and what appeared to me at the time as silly 
symbolic games in mathematics class. Yet even relevance was still not enough to allow 
me to see the “inside” mathematical thinking behind and beyond automatic calculation. 
There were several childhood mathematical moments I might choos where the 
mathematics I encountered at school became real for me. One began when my father took 
me to the bank at age 12 after I asked for a bicycle. “Of course you can have a bike if you 
want one,” he replied which came as a bit of a shock. “It’s time you learned about credit,” 
he continued. My father then took me to the local Credit Union where I met the manager 
and a loan was promptly organized for $35 at an annual interest rate of 12%. As the 
months passed and I slowly repaid the loan from my paper route earnings, I became 
acutely aware of the importance of percentage.  
Another example came when the older brother of a friend showed me how to play 
chess in the second or third grade. I progressed from mastering the moves of each piece, 
to seeing geometric patterns on the board, to strategizing several moves ahead by setting 
up scenarios and traps for my opponent. Baseball pitchers’ earned run averages, hitters’ 
batting averages, and ice hockey goalkeepers’ goals-against average taught me the 
nuances of the average and its relation to probability. The geometry and physics of the 
snooker table and the combinations of rationality and strength involved in carpentry and 
auto mechanics were also part of the general mathematical education of a working class 
adolescent in the 1970s in small town Canada.  Still, I floundered in mathematics class. 
These lessons were indeed real and they made me a wiser consumer, better at 
DIY, more astute in strategic games, and a more informed sports fan. They brought me 
into contact with the systematic ordering that mathematics can provide. But they did not 
cause me to change my mind in the sense of being better prepared, for example, for the 
inferential statistics I would be required to get my head around in higher degrees in the 
social sciences.  The situations I recount in this narrative relate to specific mathematical 
moments that caused me to think about the world differently, not because of the neatness 
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and utility of mathematical thinking, but rather because of the disorder introduced to me 
by mathematical engagement. I wonder here whether the disorder of mathematics is 
potentially more important than the order it is often purported to represent.  Furthermore, 
I wonder whether or not mathematics education should not be more explicitly oriented 
toward creating dissonance and uncertainty more than order and rule-following. 
In the first mathematical narrative shared below, I encountered difficulty with 
mathematics as a set of pure, context-free calculations. In this situation I was assumed to 
possess more mathematical skills than others in my working group simply because I was 
a university student accustomed to “paper work.” In the end though, it was one of my 
railway track-gang colleagues who showed me how to use mathematical principles in a 
messy world. This instruction in “good enough” mathematics or estimation, allowed me 
to achieve a workable, approximate solution rather than a theoretically perfect disaster. In 
other words, I learned to take mathematical abstractions and ground them in a messy 
lived situations. In the second instance, I describe how one of my elementary school 
students made the leap in the opposite direction by leaving the concreteness of her 
corporeal world to enter an imagined, abstract mathematical space. There she met a 
spectral average person and began the journey that eventually led her to an advanced 
degree in physics. 
II. Ordering a disorderly world: The good enough curve 
Through the late 1970s and early 80s, I attended university in fall and winter and worked 
on railway track crews, or “gangs” through the spring and summer months. I loved the 
separation of these two parts of my life. In winter I could read and socialize with friends 
at university and when the weather warmed up in May I would go to work until late 
August and the end of summer to return once again to university study. The year I turned 
twenty, I took a job on a “surfacing gang”. I worked as a labourer shovelling gravel and 
spiking railway ties while a group of three machines lifted, surfaced and aligned the 
track. It was hot, sweaty work involving some manual dexterity, but mostly raw physical 
strength.  
My role was to be part of a crew of labourers who worked alongside the 
machinery taking care of those inevitable anomalies along the track that foiled the flow of 
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mechanized production. Our job was to keep the machines working steadily and 
efficiently, clearing obstacles to production. The three machines used by this late 1970s 
surfacing gang on a marginal rail line in Atlantic Canada are shown in Figures 1-3.  
 
 
Fig. 1  Torsion beam tamper 
 
First in line is the torsion beam tamper (Fig. 1). This machine raised the track, 
levelled it, and tamped gravel beneath the ties. The “projection buggy” in front shone a 
light back at the machine that would regulate how high the tamper should raise the track 
to make it level. This was done when the black triangular board on the front of the 
machine raised enough to block the light, which caused the tamper jacks to stop lifting 
the track. 
 
 
Fig. 2  Track liner 
 
Next came the track liner (Fig. 2) that aligned the track into neat parallels. By the 
early 1980s this machine was pretty much obsolete and the only photo I could find is this 
  Corbett 
	
one. The mechanism on the front drove a large metal pin or “spud” into the ground to 
stabilized the machine and then hydraulic motors moved the track either left or right in 
order to straighten it.  
 
 
Fig. 3  Ballast regulator 
 
Finally, the ballast regulator depicted in Figure 3 distributed the ballast gravel and 
swept the track bed clean with enormous circular brushes. The end result was smooth, 
stable, flat-surfaced (no bumps), aligned, and neat railway track.  
One day the foreman came to me and said something like this: “Murray got a job 
up the line.” Murray was the “curve plotter” who worked with the middle machine, the 
track liner. The foreman went on to say something like this: “You’re a college boy so you 
can go work with the track liner graphing curves.” I had no idea what Murray did, and 
neither did the foreman when I asked him. The foreman figured that I could handle the 
“paperwork” because of my “college” background.  I wasn’t really given a choice. 
I was “trained” by the somewhat taciturn man running the track liner and given a 
book that contained engineering specifications for each curve on the line.  Straight track 
was easy. I had nothing to do. I brought a novel and sat on a rock as the track line worked 
away. But when we encountered curves I had to take readings at specific intervals, using 
an apparatus that measured alignment or lack of alignment of a segment of curved track, 
and plot the existing curve on graph paper. I was given an instruction manual that had 
diagrams such as this patent drawing for this procedure to illustrate what I was supposed 
to do (Figure 4). The dots on he graph paper represented readings taken by the operator 
indicating the actual position of the track before alignment.  The curve on the graph paper 
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represents the best fitting line and my machine would move the track left or right until the 
track sat exactly on the plotted curve. 
 
Fig. 4  Patent diagram for railway track alignment 
 
Thus, after plotting the existing curve on graph paper, I then created a best fitting 
line that would make the curve nicely rounded and match the engineering specifications 
for how the curve was supposed to look, roughly in accordance with the diagram in 
Figure 4. The result, for a curve that was not substantially “out of line” would look 
something like Figure 5.   
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Fig. 5  Best fitting line 
 
My job was then to return with the track-aligning machine to the beginning of the 
curve, which would pull each errant x (which represented the actual “disordered” position 
of the track) onto the rounded curve, which represented the desired orderly, “lined” track. 
This was consequential work.  If I did my job poorly, a train could derail. So I dutifully 
consulted the engineering manual and plotted my curves with great care.  For the first 
couple of curves, things went quite well, but then we moved into an area of wet ground 
where the track had sunk into the mud and was badly misaligned when the tamper 
completed its lift and surface. We managed to get the straight track sorted out but the 
curves were a mess. On my plot, each little x was well away from any nice rounded 
regulation curve that I could draw. So as we returned to straighten the track, we needed to 
move the track enormous distances to make it fit my ideal line. After a time we realized 
that we were pulling the track almost out of the rail bed in order to create the desired 
curve. 
We carried on for a time. The foreman started to get nervous because we were 
falling behind the tamper and slowing up production. The man who ran the ballast 
regulator behind us waited patiently in the cab of his dusty machine sometimes emerging 
to give us advice. Our curve was perfect and orderly. The “math” looked good. The 
trouble was that my orderly plot did not fit the disorderliness of the existing rail bed, and 
by moving the track so far we were destabilizing it. Everyone could see that there was a 
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problem. A mechanic and the superintendent were called in. They looked at the track. 
They looked at my plots. They looked at the engineering manuals. Everything was done 
according to the rules, but the result was extremely slow progress because we were 
moving the track back to where it was when the railway was built generations before. I 
was left to continue on.   
Eventually, the tamper operator wandered back to see what we were doing.  His 
machine was so far ahead of ours that he couldn’t really carry on further. When he looked 
at what I was doing he said, “wait a minute, this can’t work.” He explained to me that 
when you encounter a curve that is seriously askew as this one was a perfect curve is 
impossible. Forget the engineering specifications he said. “You aren’t building that 
perfect track, you’re fixing this one. Those fools who run this railway don’t live in the 
real world with us.” Then he showed me how to make an imperfect curve out of a series 
of “steps” (Fig. 6). "Them x’s are what you have to work with son, not what’s in that 
book,” he said. 
 
 
Fig. 6  An imperfect “curve” created in steps 
 
By constructing the curve as a series of stepped line segments (Fig 6), I could 
create a good-enough functional and safe approximate curve that would look great and 
take much less time.  I carried on this way for the rest of the summer and had lots of time 
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to sit on the rocks amidst the din of the machinery and read my books. The foreman was 
happy; production had returned to normal.  
At issue here is the truth of the text, in this case the engineering specifications and 
the ideal mathematics that they imagined. In the end, experience, risk, improvisation and 
judgment were required to tame the formatting power of the mathematics (Skovsmose, 
1994) that was understood to rule the situation. It is perhaps not surprising that none of 
my superiors could tell me how to dissolve the abstract mathematical order, bend the 
rules, and fabricate a different mathematics that would create an approximated order and 
allow the work to proceed.  I was shown, by a peer how to juxtapose formal rule-
following with estimation and site-specific human judgment necessary to produce a 
“good enough” railway curve. D. W. Winnicott (1995) developed his concept of the good 
enough mother to describe a desirable level of parental care. Too much attention will 
damage the child, as will not enough. There is a sweet spot of good-enoughness that 
allows the child autonomy but gives enough direction to support development.  
How to find that good–enough space is always a matter of estimation and more or 
less calculated imperfection. In this experience I came to see mathematics as a matter of 
skilled improvisation, judgment and even creativity. I had to judge the extent to which the 
actually existing curve could be aligned to approximate the perfect curves inscribed in the 
engineering diagrams.  
By the end of the summer I seldom consulted the technical manual and relied 
more and more on my ability to construct a smooth but imperfect curve. I had no idea that 
I had stumbled on a set of ancient mathematical problems that led out of the Pythagorean 
Theorem, to pi and the calculation of the area of circles, and on to Newton’s calculus. 
This realization took another twenty years and chance encounters with mathematical 
ideas in narrative form (Ogawa 2009, Ellenberg 2014).  
III. A counterintuitive mathematical leap: Imagining someone who isn’t there 
A fundamental problem in learning mathematics is, in my view, a question of trust that 
allows the mathematician to navigate and negotiate between the corporeal world and a 
dimension of thought where sets of relational abstractions operate. These abstractions, 
powerful as they are, require a certain kind of faith and a leap into the unknown for 
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children. Much mathematical curriculum today seeks to concretize these relational 
abstractions, but in the end, the goal is to cause the learner to abandon a fixation on the 
concrete and enter another dimension of relational thought. 
In the Childhood of Jesus, J. M. Coetzee (2013) creates the character of a child 
who refuses to either read, write or do the mathematics required of him in school. His 
particular rationale for not engaging with mathematics is because he finds the basic 
problem of counting and adding things together to be problematic. One and one do not 
equal two, because for this child each individual thing is unique and different.  
Put an apple before him and what does he see? An apple; not one apple, just an apple. Put 
two apples before him. What does he see? An apple and an apple. Now along comes Señor 
Leon (Señor  Leon is his class teacher) who demands: How many apples child? What is the 
answer? What are apples? What is the singular of which apples is the plural? Three men in 
a car heading for East blocks: who is the singular of which men is the plural-Eugenio or 
Simon or our friend the driver whose name I don’t know? Are we three, or are we one and 
one and one? (Coetzee 2013, p. 284 – italics in original) 
The child’s radical ontology caused him to see the world in terms of discrete 
things that should not be reduced to comparable classes, and thus, which were impossible 
to sensibly combine through a simple act of calculation.  Without making this 
fundamental ontological leap required of all school children, is mathematics even 
possible? It is this leap that we expect students to make. But why should they? Like 
Coetzee’s protagonist, I am not asking this question in a cheeky way, but rather to 
suggest that one effect of developing a mathematical sensibility is to learn to think in 
reductionist ways rather than in ways that to recognize subtle differences and attend to 
nuance. In discussions of research methodology this is not a particularly new 
conversation and problems of the juxtaposition of classification and rich description are 
routinely discussed and debated. In curriculum conversations, mathematics education 
discourse and particularly in the political spaces concerned with boosting test scores and 
implementing programs, an “attitude” like that Coetzee’s protagonist undoubtedly 
appears dangerous and disorderly, if not sick and disordered. Can we assume though that 
all children should and will make this ontological leap easily and naturally. And to what 
extent? A related question concerns how the child in Coetzee’s novel might have been 
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taught mathematics in such a way that his formal mathematical skills might have 
developed. 
The second mathematical moment I want to relate came from a teaching 
experience in rural Nova Scotia (Canada). I was, for nearly a decade, a teacher in a grade 
5-6 multigrade classroom in a small school. This was the early 1990s and the NCTM 
standards were newly embedded in provincial curriculum from primary to grade 12. 
Primary teachers, myself included, struggled with the expanded scope of what we were 
expected to do with our students.  The established mathematics curriculum focussed 
primarily on speed and accuracy, for the most part in basic operations algorithms, 
combined with a very cursory introduction to percentage, fractions, ratio, simple 
geometry, etc. Prior to reforms in mathematics curriculum of the 1990s, automaticity, 
speed and accuracy in simple calculations were pretty much all that was required of both 
primary students and of their teachers. And of course, the struggle over curriculum 
continues in debates around return to mathematical “basics” which continue in many 
contexts to be constructed in terms of automatic calculation. 
One of the NCTM strands that teachers in my school seemed to be able to grasp 
most easily was statistics. We worked on sampling and probability through a wide range 
of experiences and data collection exercises. I spent about three weeks with my class in 
an attempt to determine whether Black Jack is a fair game. The dealer in our games had 
to hit until the points totalled 17 and then stop. Players could do what they wanted. We 
recorded each game played and after several hundred recorded games concluded that 
overall, the dealer was in a winning position and that Black Jack was not a fair game. It 
was obvious that the children who were assigned to be dealers had more of our fake 
currency than those assigned as players. I saw this exercise as one form of childproofing.  
We also did a number of surveys, some of which included investigations of 
student opinion on aspects of school policy such as how to divide the playground 
amongst different age groups. Very quickly my grades 5 and 6 students who were the 
eldest in the school learned to manipulate their surveys, at first by over-sampling children 
in their classes and then by manipulating younger students to give the answers they 
wanted. All of this led to discussions about sampling and the ethics of consent and indeed 
about power and persuasion. 
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When it came to calculating central tendency in data using mean, the median and 
mode, we did a fairly standard exercise with the height and weight of students in the 
class. When it came to the average weight and height of the children in the class, the 
result failed to match the results for any particular person. I think I must have been using 
the terms normal, average, and mean interchangeably because one student made the 
remark that there is no one in the class who is normal. I don’t have the verbatim transcript 
but it went something like this: 
Student 1: Normal weight in this class is 96 lbs.  But nobody is 96 lbs. 
Teacher: That’s right. 
Student 2:  That means that none of us are normal (laughter and snide comments). 
Teacher: The mean is a concept, it means the middle. 
Student 3: The middle of what? 
Teacher: Well, the middle of the group. 
Student 1: Like when we all lined up from the shortest to the tallest there was someone in 
the middle.   
Teacher: (Attempting humor) Yes, that is the mean person … you’re not laughing.  
Actually this is the median person. 
Student 1: But the math is wrong because there is nobody in the middle for weight.   
Student 3: What do you mean? 
Student 1: Nobody is 96 lbs., so nobody is in the middle.   
Teacher: Nobody has to be in the middle.  They might be, but in this case nobody was.   
Student 2: So the math is wrong. 
Teacher: No, the math is right but nobody fits exactly in the middle. 
Student 1: So who is the mean? 
Teacher: Nobody.  It’s an idea. 
Student 1: Not a person? 
Teacher: That’s right. 
Student 1: So they expect us to imagine a person who isn’t there.   
This is an exchange that betrays my own lack of attention to the distinctions 
between statistical and social norms or between mathematical and value-laden ethical 
language. This raises the question as to why I used the term “normal” at all knowing full 
well its value-laden implications it held for my students. I have no answer to this question 
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other than to suggest that my linguistic carelessness with mathematical language is 
probably not unusual, and that it is indicative of the relatively disorderly way I 
approached the teaching of mathematics.   
There are a number of other things I remember from this exchange. Student 1 was 
struggling to get her head around a disembodied concept. We went on to establish a 
persona for the “mean boy” and “mean girl,” the shadowy character who sat in the middle 
of things and who was perfectly “normal” but who was invisible, malicious, and couldn’t 
be trusted. Using the mechanism of the person who wasn’t there, some students were able 
to embrace and play with the ideas of central tendency and data itself as an abstraction 
drawn from living beings. But at the same time, my blurring of normative and descriptive 
mathematical terminology probably created additional confusion. This illustrates how as 
a teacher, I inelegantly used the relatively disorderly ethical normative language to 
promote an orderly understanding of a mathematical relationship. 
Student 1 shows particular creativity and insight, in part because she found a 
space in which to play between order and disorder. She asked a provocative mathematical 
question when she wondered about the identity of the mean itself. Who is in the middle 
of a data set, or who is normal? In doing so she illustrated her ability to abstract or in 
effect, to be wiling to make an ontological leap and see what isn’t there categorizing 
things and beings based upon characteristics operationalized as variables. She may or 
may not have confused statistical and social uses of the term normal, but the core feature 
of this shift is to move from seeing concrete individuals to seeing variables and 
categories, i.e. things that are not really there. This ability to extrapolate the invisible out 
of the visible is, in important respects, the sort of ontological move necessary for 
participation in formal mathematical learning. In a sense, one must be able to see what is 
not there, move beyond context-bound perception, and trust in an abstract vision. Was my 
student developing a foundational sense of the larger notion of inference and was she, as 
a result of her playful questioning about an absent presence, on the way to powerful 
mathematical thinking in the sense of Michael Young’s (2007) conception of “powerful 
knowledge” as non context-dependent, systematic and specialized? Of course, I can never 
know for certain.   
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IV. Back into context: Social class, formatting and power 
One way to think about the problem of the invisible being in the middle of a group of 
people who are reduced to data points is to consider how classification has been found to 
operate amongst differently positioned social actors. What I am trying to suggest above is 
that it is not the instances in which mathematics came to seem real and useful to me (as 
important as they were) that were most important to the refinement of what I would now 
see as a more developed mathematical sensibility that can help me see what is not 
obviously there. 
The general findings associated with the work of Bernstein (1977), for instance, 
advance the claim that middle class students are more likely to use general classification 
strategies to group objects while working class students are more likely to generate 
classifications that are more specific to their personal lives (Bernstein 2000, Cooper 
1998, Holland 1981, Walkerdine 1988). This is the ability to appropriately use what 
Bernstein (2000, p. 31) called “recognition rules” or the inclination to understand the 
particularities of the context from another point of sight and the power relations in play 
within the context. The capacity to do this in school tasks is, following Bernstein, 
unevenly distributed amongst the social classes with people positioned more marginally 
tending to think in ways that relate intimately to an immediate, experiential locale. As 
Cooper (1998) points out, this is not a question of concrete or abstract thinking, but rather 
one that is more or less attuned to presence and absence and the immediacy of the 
lifeworld, and I would argue, family, mobility and literacy practices. What academic 
study requires is what I have described elsewhere as a kind of mobile sensibility that is 
able to transcend place (Corbett 2005, 2009).     
I think this mathematical sensibility may also involve a way of thinking about the 
world that takes too seriously spectral presences found in manufactured mathematical 
space. Today, there is growing concern about the algorithms that make choices for us and 
that structure the way we are governed and targeted for marketing. Some of the best 
minds of the emerging generation of capitalists owe their fortunes not to making objects 
or finding and processing resources, but rather, to having advanced mathematical skills 
combined with business acumen and foresight relating to the creation of nonmaterial 
objects. The fact that Mark Zuckerberg, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Elon Musk and 
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Tasmania’s David Walsh are mathematicians or at least mathematical enthusiasts whose 
products are essentially ideas, creates fuel for the myth that mathematics paves the road 
to prosperity. Like many myths, this one contains truth. As I suggest above though, there 
seems to be evidence that the societies that seem to produce the best results collectively 
on international assessments of mathematics may not be leading the world in economic 
and social innovation. But the myth of mathematics as the engine of growth and 
development also contains a core conservative kernel, which is that the game itself is 
what is important rather than the algorithms and assumptions that make the game work. It 
also assumes that understanding the game itself, and becoming an efficient and effective 
player, rather than challenging or questioning the way it is constituted is more 
fundamental to education. All games though have cultural, social and political roots and 
they contain foundational assumptions that format and organize play and perception. 
I offer one final story that is now more than 20 years old. When my son was a 
small boy, he was fascinated with computers and gaming. One of the first computer 
games we played was Sim City. My son enjoyed playing this game and he quickly learned 
how to get his cities to grow to a great size in a peaceable and prosperous way. On the 
other hand, my cities would often descend into chaos and fail to grow. So one day I asked 
him how he managed to grow such vibrant and prosperous cities. “Simple,” he said. 
“Two things you need to keep in mind. First of all, keep the taxes below 7%. Secondly 
make sure you have lots of police stations.” He showed me both how to prosper in the 
game but also how the assumptions built into the algorithm were subtly training gamers 
to think conservatively. 
Mathematics is intimately involved in political spaces, and the ways in which 
hidden mathematics structures social space, the mathematization of the world, is a topic 
that ought to be foregrounded in contemporary curriculum. Often though it appears that 
there is more public and political interest in teaching primary school students how to code 
than there is in teaching them how to think about the way that their experience in real and 
imagined space is coded. Could it be, all of the rhetoric about how STEM education is 
crucial for future economic prosperity, that there is more money to be made by teaching 
children to do as they are told? While there seems to be less interest today in automaticity 
and speed and more interest in analytic thought to meet the human resource needs of 
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contemporary capital, the ideal mathematics student imagined in contemporary 
curriculum may be no more engaged than I was in my 1960s and 70s school mathematics 
classes.   
It is also still the case that highly divergent mathematical content is offered to 
young people differently positioned in social space (Schmidt, Burroughs, Zoido & 
Houang 2015). It is encouraging that there is work in mathematics education that helps 
young people understand how math is a tool that can be used to illuminate situations of 
social injustice and oppression, which is important as well (Gutstein 2003, Moses & 
Cobb 2002, Skovsmose 1994a). There is no avoiding how mathematics is intimately 
bound up in the intricacies of a messy world, power differentials, unequal access to 
resoruces, and diverse forms of social practice. Indeed mathematics itself is social 
practice that is unevenly distributed and differentially taught along the lines of 
contemporary social divisions such as social class, race, ethnicity and gender. This leads 
me to the conclusion that there is good evidence to support the idea that for some, even 
for most people, the demathematization of everyday life will only deepen even as 
mathematics becomes more central to the way life is organized.   
What this comes around to is the relationship between identity and mathematics, 
which is why I chose narrative to illustrate my argument. First of all, as my story of the 
good enough curve illustrates, the mathematical understandings I have acquired have 
come to me through experience. I wonder if my notion of narrative “mathematical 
moments” might have value in mathematics education? Can we help our students find 
and tell mathematical stories from their lives? Secondly, mathematics must take place 
somewhere, which is the point of the first story; but it must also take place nowhere, 
which is the point of the second story. In the two stories, the problem of visibility and 
invisibility, tangibility and intangibility, order and disorder illustrate how what I 
understand to be powerful mathematics learning occurs in the thirdspace in-between. The 
examples I used foreground the importance of those moments in which school 
mathematics became “real”. Much mathematics curriculum today is properly focussed on 
the experiential hooks that ought to be present in good math learning. Nevertheless, what 
mattered more were those biographical situations that involved an integration of order 
and disorder.   
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Thirdly, my last story raises political questions about the formatting power of 
mathematics and questions of power more generally in mathematics and in mathematics 
education. Extending the problem of power and the extrapolation of powerful learning 
from local contexts remains a problem upon which we have not made significant progress 
in decades of educational research. In a recent analysis of AERA presidential addresses 
relating to what we know about learning, Carol Lee (2016) concludes that most of what 
educational research has discovered is tempered by how little we still understand about 
the all important influence of context. Following Bernstein’s (1977) lead, the relationship 
between different knowledge forms and the places and spaces in which they are enacted 
and valued remains the most difficult and intractable of educational problems.   
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